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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Britt Burton (hereinafter Burton) appeals from the District Court's decision upon 
judicial review affirming the order of the idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter 
ITD) suspending Burton's driver's license afker Burton's failure of an evidentiary test and 
her arrest for DUI. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
ITD agrees with the "Course of Proceedings" as described in the brief filed by the 
Appellant. 
11. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 2:26 a.m. on August 26,2007, Burton was leaving St. Maries, 
Idaho, on Highway 3. A.L.S. Hrg. Transcript 9:3-10; R.29. Highway 3 is primarily a two 
lane highway. While traveling uphill, the highway expands to include a passing lane on 
the left. Burton continued to travel in the right hand lane. While traveling up the hill, 
Burton passed a traffic sign which indicated "the lanes were going to merge." ALS 
transcript, pages 11 & 12; R. 31-32.' 
At the same time and place, Benewah County Sheriffs Officer Sidney E. Hilton 
(hereinafter Officer Hilton) was patrolling Highway 3. Officer Hilton observed vehicle 
I The transcript from Burton's testimony states: 
Q: Okay. And then did the sign tell you which lane disappeared or did it just show that the line- 
that the- lanes merged? 
A: It just showed that the lanes merged. 
ALS Transcript, page 12; R. 32. 
(license # 3B34991) fail to signal when it merged lanes. Affidavit of Officer Hilton; 
Court's Exhibit 1:s. At that point, he stopped Burton's vehicle at about milepost 81. 
When he made contact with the driver, Officer Hilton advised her why he had stopped 
her. She [Burton] stated . . . "I never signal when I merge lanes." Affidavit of Officer 
Hilton; Court's Exhibit 1:9. During the exchange, Officer Hilton noticed a strong odor of 
alcohol emanating from the vehicle and thus asked Burton if she had been drinking 
Burton admitted that she had consumed two beers. Id 
Officer Hilton requested Burton to perform a series of field sobriety tests to which 
she consented. Id. Burton failed all three tests and was placed under arrest ibr D.U.1 
Officer Hilton transported Burton to the Benewah County Sheriffs office, where he 
proceeded to check her moutl~ for any foreign substances. Id. He then played an advisory 
audio tape and waited fifteen minutes. Id. Burton then submitted to two breath tests, with 
the results of ,156 and ,152 respectively. Burton was thereafter cited for D.U.I. and 
notified that her license was suspended. 
On August 29,2007, Burton requested an administrative review of her license 
suspension. Court's Exhibit 1:23-26. Her appeal was heard by an ITD hearing officer on 
September 17,2009. Based upon the testimo~iy of Burton and the evidence from the 
hearing, on September 26,2009 the hearing officer issued findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Court's Exhibit 1:5-14. In the Findings of Fact regarding legal cause 
for the officer to stop Burton, the hearing officer found as follows: 
1. Officer Hilton observed the vehicle driven by Burton fail to use the vehicle's 
turn signals when merging from lane of travel to another lane of travel as 
required by Idaho Code 5 49-808(1). 
2. Idaho Code § 18-8002A(b)(ii) does not require a police officer to state a 
specific Idaho code violation in their sworn statement when setting forth a legal 
cause to stop a petitioner's vehicle. 
3. Exhibit 3 is sufficient pursuant to Idaho Code 9 18-8002A(S)(b)(ii) in 
describing Officer Milton's legal cause for the stopping the vehicle Burton was 
driving. 
4. Legal issues such as those noted in Exhibits A and B are not one of the issues 
that an administrative license suspension (ALS) hearing officer can rule on as 
provided in Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7) and supported by State v. Kane (139 
Idaho 586). 
5. Burton's ALS cannot be vacated based upon what was articulated in both 
Exhibits A and B. 
6. Officer Milton had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Burton. 
Court's Exhibit 1:8. At the conclusion of the decision, the hearing officer upheld the 
license suspension. On September 26,2007, Burton filed a Petition for Judicial Review. 
On April 13,2009, the Honorable Fred Gibler denied the Petition for Judicial Review and 
upheld ITD's decision to suspend Burton's driver's license. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether LC. 5 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied to this case 
because it fails to provide fair notice that signaling is appropriate when the roadway 
design necessitates merging from two lanes into one lane. 
B. Whether I.C. 3 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied to this case 
because it fails to establish minimal guidelines as to what is an "appropriate signal" to 
govern enforcement of the statute. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of 
department decisiorts to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's 
driver's license. See I.C. $ 5  49-201,49-330,67-5201(2), 67-5270 and In re Suspension o j  
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct.App. 2006). In an appeal 
from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this 
Court reviews the agency record independently oEthe district court's decision. Marshall 
v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct.App.2002). This 
Coui? does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. I.C. $ 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. This 
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Castaneda v. Brighton Cory., 130 Idaho 923, 926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. Uvvutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. ofCommfs, 134 
Idaho 353, 357,2 P.3d 738,742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. I.C. $ 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. $ 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd ofCounty 
Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." I.C. 3 67-5279(3) 
B. Argument 
Burton's challenge to the suspension is centered upon a contention that iTD 
enoneously found that the stop of Burton's vehicle by Officer Hilton was based upon 
legal cause. The discussion will begin with a11 overview of an ALS suspensiol~ in Idaho. 
The background of an ALS suspension was described by the Court of Appeals in 
In re Suspension ofDriver's License ofGibbar, I43 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 
2006). The Court stated: 
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. 3 18-8002A, 
requires that the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) suspend the driver's 
license of a driver who has failed a BAC test administered by a law enforcement 
officer. The period of suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an 
evidentiary test and one year for any subsequent test failure within five years. I.C. 
3 18-8002A(4)(a). A person who has been notified of such an administrative 
license suspension may request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by 
the ITD to contest the suspension. I.C. 3 18-8002A(7). At the administrative 
hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to 
vacate the suspension. I.C. 3 18-8002A(). The hearing officer must uphold the 
suspension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
driver has shown one of several grounds enumerated in I.C. 3 18-8002A(7) for 
vacating the suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
The hearing officer's decision is subject to challenge through a petition for 
judicial review. I.C. 3 18-8002A(8). 
Id., 155 P.3d at 181 1 (citations omitted). 
In Gibbau, the defendant argued that the evidence did not support a finding that 
the officer had legal cause to stop him. The Court of Appeals disagreed and in its 
discussion of the law stated: 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and 
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Under the Fourth ~mendment,  an officer may stop a vehicle to 
investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. The 
reasonableness of the suspicion innst be evaluated upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop. The reasonable suspicion standard requires 
less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of 
the officer. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her 
possession, and those inferences may be drawn froin the officer's experience and 
law enforcement training. Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the 
conduct observed by the officer fell within the broad range of what can be 
described as normal driving behavior. 
Id, at p. 1 18 1-2 (citations omitted). 
In the Burton case, the hearing officer found that Officer Hilton stopped Burton 
for moving left on the roadway without signaling, in violation of I.C. 5 49-808. 
Subsections one and two of that statute provide as follows: 
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle oilto a highway or move a vehicle right or 
left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety tior without giving an appropriate 
signal. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and 
before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for 
not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last 
one hundred (1 00) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
Burton argues that I.C. 5 49-808 is void-for-vagueness as applied to her.' The 
general analysis for a void-for-vagueness analysis was discussed by the court in State v. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,69 P.3d 126 (2003). In Kovsen, the Court stated: 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This doctrine requires that a 
statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
that the statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. 
Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required at the peril of 
loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. This Court has held 
that due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids" and that "men of comlnon intelligence" not be forced to guess at the 
lneanine of the criminal law. A statute lnav be void for vagueness if it fails to give - - - 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it 
proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement 
br others who must enforce the statute. 
A statute may be challenged as ullconstitutionally vague on its face or as 
applied to a defendant's conduct. For a "facial vagt~eness" challenge to be 
successful, "the complainant must delnonstrate that the law is impernlissibly 
vague in all of its applications." In other words, the challenger must show that the 
enactment is invalid in toto. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a 
complainant must show that the statute, as applied lo the defendant's conduct, 
failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed 
to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to arrest him. A "facial vagueness" analysis is mutually 
exclusive from an "as applied" analysis. 
Id., 138 Idaho at 71 1-12, 69 P.3d at 13 1-133 (citations omitted). In State v. Schumacher, 
136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001) the Court of Appeals stated: 
An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that will 
uphold its constitutionality. A statute's possible infirmity for vagueness may be 
avoided by a judicial construction of the statute that is consistent with legislative 
intent and comports with constitutional limitations. When interpreting a statute, 
we begin with the supposition that the legislature intended the ordinary meaning 
of the words it used unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed. 
Burton does not argue that I.C. 5 49-808 is void-for-vagueness in all its applications 
Id ,  136 Idaho at 519, 37 P.3d at 16 (citations omitted). In State v. Dewbue, 133 Idaho 
663,991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999)., the Court explained: 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. 
Generally, "[wlords and phrases are construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language." I.C. 5 73-1 13. A statute must be construed so 
that effect is given to every word and clause of a statute. The task of the court "in 
interpreting the meaning of language contained in a statute is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent and purpose." There is no occasion for construction where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. "The plain, obvious and rational 
meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning." 
Id., at pages 665-666 (citations omitted). As explained below, the language of I.C. 5 49- 
808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. 
1. I.C. 3 49-808 is Not Void for Vagueness Because I.C. 5 49-808 Gives 
Adequate Notice to People of Ordinary Intelligence Concerning the Conduct 
Proscribed. 
Burton argues that I.C. 5 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her 
because it failed to provide her with fair notice that her conduct was proscribed. This 
argument was rejected by the District Court: because it was not supported by the law or 
the facts of this case. 
Judge Gibler examined the evidence presented to the hearing officer in the form 
of the testimony of Burton and the Afidavit of Officer Hilton. After his analysis of the 
evidence and the law, Judge Gibler concluded the following: 
Thus, under Burton's testimony, the sign present indicated that the left lane, and 
the traffic therein, was to merge right, and the right lane, and Burton who was 
traveling in the right lane therein, was to merge left. Even if Burton was incorrect 
that the left lane merged right, Burton admitted, by implication at least, that the 
sign required her to merge left. . . . 
Under the statute, Burton's movement of merging left required a signal. 
Although ending of Burton's lane of travel required her to enter the parallel lane 
of travel, Burton's entry into the other lane was nonetheless a leftward movement 
when viewed relative to the other lane. I-Iere Burton failed to signal when she 
merged from her lane of travel into the final lane of travel to the left of her 
vehicle, violating the statutory requirement of a signal when a vehicle "move[s] 
. . . right of left upon a highway." Accordingly, this language is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton. 
Opinion & Order Re: Appeal, page 6; R.75 (emphasis added). 
The result of the District Court is consistent with State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 
991 P.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999). The facts in Dewbre were explained as follows: 
Just after midnight on June 1, 1996, an Idaho State police officer was traveling on 
Niglrway 57 in Bonner County, when he began following Dewbre's vehicle. 
Highway 57 is a two-lane road with an occasional passing area where the single 
one-directional lane splits into two, creating a temporary passing lane. Dewbre 
entered one of these passing areas. A sign was located near the beginning of the 
passing area directing traffic to stay to the right except to pass. Two traffic signs 
and painted arrows on the roadway near the end of the passing area advised traffic 
that the passing lane was ending and that traffic should merge left. Upon entering 
this passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle into the right lane. After driving 
beyond the last dashed line at the end of the passing area, Dewbre moved his 
vehicle froin the right lane into the remaining single lane. Because Dewbre failed 
to signal while making these maneuvers, the officer stopped Dewbre for violating 
I.C. 5 49-808. 
Id., at 664. Dewbre filed a motion to suppress based upon a lack of reasonable suspicion 
to stop his vehicle. Dewbre contended that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion to 
stop his vehicle because I.C. 5 49-808 does not require the use of signals when entering 
or exiting a passing lane, Dewbre contended that I.C. 5 49-808 requires the use of turn 
signals only when a vehicle turns or makes a lane change. The magistrate denied the 
motion to suppress and the District Court affirmed the magistrate. Chief Judge Perry, 
writing for the Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court and explained: 
The language of I.C. 5 49-808 is plain and unambiguous and must be given effect. 
[W]henever a vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane splits into 
two lanes, or two lanes merge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required 
pursuant to I.C. $49-808. Therefore, I.C. $ 49-808 required Dewbre to use an 
appropriate signal when he moved to the right while entering the passing area and 
then to the left while exiting the passing area. 
Id,, 133 Idaho at 666,991 p.2d at 391. Chief Judge Perry continued: 
Upon entering the passing area, Dewbre moved his vehicle to the right in order to 
co~uply with the highway signage. Upon exiting the passing area, Dewbre moved 
his vehicle to the ief?, complying once again with the highway signage. There are 
no exceptiol~s in LC. $ 49-808 to the signal requirement. Whenever a movernent 
is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is 
made necessary to comply with highway signage, an appropriate signal is required 
pursuant to I.C. $ 49-808. 
I do not attempt by this holding to define the boundaries of what constitutes a 
"movement to the right or left upon a highway." I conclude only that Dewbre's 
movements placed him within the ambit of the statute. Until further clarification 
is provided by the Idaho legislature, I am constrained to hold that whenever a 
vehicle moves to the right or to the left because one lane splits into two lanes, or 
two lanes merge into one lane, an appropriate signal is required pursuant to I.C. $ 
49-808. Therefore, I.C. $ 49-808 required Dewbre to use an appropriate signal 
when he moved to the right while entering the passing area and then to the left 
while exiting the passing area. 
Id., at 666. [the Court's emphasis] (citations omitted). Judge Schwartzman, who 
concurred in the result, found that "since the officer had some objective measure of 
probable cause to believe that Dewbre violated the traffic code, the stop would now be 
constitutionally reasonable and justified." I d ,  at 667,991 P.2d at 392 
Likewise, Burton's movement on the highway placed her within the ambit of the 
statute and when she moved to the left because two lanes merged into one, an appropriate 
signal is required. Here, Judge Gibler upheld the findings of the hearing officer and 
correctly found that the "sign [on Highway 3j  required her to lnerge left" and "Burton's 
movement of merging left required a signal." Therefore, the statute was not void for 
vagueness. 
2. I.C. 5 49-808 is Not Void for Vagueness Because I.C. 5 49-808 Establishes 
Minimal Guidelines to Govern Law Enforcement Persons 
and Others Who Must Enforce the Statute. 
Burton argues that the inclusion of the plxase "appropriate signal" in the statute 
implies that there are situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate. Burton 
also contends that without further guidelines imper~nissibly gives officers complete 
discretion to decide who is and is llot violating the ~ t a t u t e . ~  This allegation is also 
without merit. 
Judge Gibler specifically rejected this argument. In his Opinion & Order, Judge 
Gibler stated: 
Burton's interpretation might be valid if the statute required a signal "if' or 
"when" appropriate. Instead, the statute requires an "appropriate signal." The 
word "appropriate" is an adjective describing the type of signal required. I11 other 
words, that statute requires a signal, hut not just any kind of signal. It requires a 
signal, but not just any kind of signal. It requires the type of signal given be 
appropriate. For example, an appropriate signal for a leftward movement on a 
highway would be the activation of the lefts blinker, and an inappropriate signal 
for the same movement leflward would be the activation of the right blinker. 
Here, Burton gave no signal, appropriate or otherwise. Accordingly, it is clear 
that Burton failed to give an appropriate signal as contemplatcd by the statute, and 
this language is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton. 
Opinion & Order Re: Appeal, page 7; R. 76, 
Here, Burton gave no signal. Accordingly, it is clear the Burton failed to give an 
appropriate signal as contemplated by the statute, and this language is not 
' Burtoil cites a decision koin Fifth District Magistrate Judge Ted Isreal in State v. Dale, Blaine County 
case #CR-2007-783, which disagreed with the Court of Appeals in Dewbre. Judge Gibler correctly 
concluded that he is hound to follow Dewbre to the extent its rationale is applicable. 
11 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton. This result is consistent with Dewbre, 
supra, which held: 
Dewbre further argues that no signal is the appropriate signal when the vehicle 
movement can be made with reasonably safety. The plain language of I.C. 5 49- 
808 provides that an individual may "move right or left upon a highway" if two 
requirements are met: (1) if "the lnovemetlt can be made with reasonable safety" 
and (2) if "an appropriate signal" is given. Even if a vehicle can be moved with 
reasonable safety, I.C. 5 49-808 still requires the use of turn signals when making 
the movement to the right or left. Furthermore, the Idaho legislature specifically 
amended the turn signal law deleting the exception Dewbre argues. Prior to the 
amendment, the statute provided that an appropriate signal was only required "in 
the event any other traflc may be clffected by such nzovement. " 1953 Idaho Sess. 
Law 507. This exception was removed in 1977 by the Idaho legislature. 1977 
Idaho Sess. Law 370. Consequently, the legislature intended that turn signals be 
used when moving right or left on a highway regardless of whether other traffic 
may be affected or a vehicle is moving with reasonable safety. I agree with the 
district court that an appropriate signal requires "such a signal as would put others 
on notice of the driver's intention to rnake a turning movement, and that it was not 
the intent of the legislature to negate the requirement of signaling when malting a 
turning movement." 
Id., 133 Idaho at 666-67, 991 P.2d at 391-93 
Here, it is undisputed that Burton merged lanes and failed to signal. The law 
requires a signal. Officer Hilton stopped Burton when he observed that she failed to use 
the vehicle's turn signal when merging from one lane to another. Burton has failed to 
demonstrate that the statute is so vague that Officer Hilton had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to stop her. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department respectfully requests that this Coufl uphold the decision of the 
hearing examiner and the District Court in this matter, and leave the suspension of 
Burton's driver's license undisturbed, 
DATED this 25 day of November, 2009. 
A-# 
Susan K. Servick 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on day of November, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document by the method indicated and addressed to the following: 
JAMES S. SIEBE 
Siebe Law Offices 
202 E. Second - J US Mail 
PO Box 9045 
Moscow, ID 83843 
&DI-VJ Y .  
Susan K. Servick 
LWL 
